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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON AND 
GRANT MILLS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CaseNo20021072-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) 
(1996) and Utah R. App. P. 3(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Issue: Whether proceedings before Judge Harding, if he were 
under the influence of, or materially impaired by, the use of 
cocaine and heroin, would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate 
due process under the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the 
United States. 
Issue: Whether the Court incorrectly ruled that the defendant is 
not entitled to conduct discovery to determine the scope, duration, 
extent and nature of the alleged use of cocaine and heroin by 
Judge Harding when he was considering Defendant's case. 
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Standard of Review: The foregoing issues may present mixed 
questions of fact and law to be analyzed pursuant to State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932,936-40 (Utah 1994). 
Appellate courts review factual questions under the clearly erroneous 
standard and legal questions under the correctness standard. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 
970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation: The foregoing issues were addressed in a Motion for 
Review and Reversal of the Honorable Ray M. Harding Jr.' Rulings on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Suppress, Motion Requesting 
Findings of Fact, and for Stay of all Further Proceedings Pending a 
Disposition of the Motion filed by the Defendant and Appellant, Terry J. 
Stephenson, (Terry) (R. 861) and his memorandum in support thereof. (R. 
883). 
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly ruled that a criminal 
investigation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a) is not 
subject to a defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly found Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-l-19(a) constitutional when it does not provide any 
constitutional protections for a defendant in a criminal 
investigation. 
Issue: Whether the court incorrectly interpreted the discovery 
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it permitted 
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the evidence gathered in civil discovery proceedings to be used in 
a criminal case. 
Issue: Whether the court incorrectly interpreted Article V Section 
1 of the Utah State Constitution when it ruled that the grant of 
authority to investigate criminal violations under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-19 does not violate the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers and that the statute is therefore 
constitutional. 
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fifth 
Amendment and Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution when it 
ruled that the use of the investigative powers of the Division of 
Securities to obtain evidence to be used in criminal prosecution 
did not violate the defendant's right against self incrimination 
guaranteed by those constitutions. 
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 
24 of the Utah State Constitution when it held that Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-19 does not violate those constitutional provisions and 
is therefore facially constitutional. 
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment Due Process Clause and Article I §§ 7 & 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution when it ruled that the Division's 
investigation did not need to comply with the requirements of the 
Subpoena Powers Act or the Grand Jury Act. 
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the parties' 
stipulation, pursuant to which the defendants believed they gave 
up the right to argue their Motion to Dismiss in exchange for the 
state's agreement to accept the defendant's version of the facts, 
when it ruled that there was no such agreement. 
Standard of Review: With respect to the foregoing issues, a trial 
court's conclusion that a statute or ordinance is constitutional presents a 
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question of law reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. State v. 
Lopes, 980 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1999) 
Preservation: The foregoing issues were addressed in Terry's Motion 
to Suppress., (R. 435) and his memorandum in support thereof. (R. 454) 
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the 
applicable provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act when it 
held that, even without a referral of the case by the Securities 
Division, the Utah County Attorney had the standing and 
authority to investigate and prosecute defendants for violations of 
the act. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of statutes is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness, e.g. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 
977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
Preservation: The foregoing issue was addressed in Terry's Motion to 
Dismiss, (R. 98) and his memorandum in support thereof. (R. 203). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Addendum 1) 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Addendum 1) 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
(Addendum 2) 
Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 3) 
Article I Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 4) 
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 4) 
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Article I Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 4) 
Article V Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 5) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-10a-l-to 77-10a-20 (Addendum 6) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1 to 77-22-5 (Addendum 7) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13 (Addendum 8) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-18 (1) (Addendum 9) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 (Addendum 10) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-21-21.5 (Addendum 11) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 (Addendum 12) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 14 (Addendum 13) 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Chapter 12 (Addendum 14) 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Chapter 13 (Addendum 15) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about April 10,1998, the Utah County Attorney, purporting to 
represent the State of Utah, charged Terry with 18 counts of Securities Fraud 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 61-1-21, 14 counts of 
Communications Fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, 9 
counts of Theft by a Fiduciary in violation of Utah code Ann. § 76-6-513, 6 
counts of Issuing a Bad Check or Draft in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-505,1 count of Theft by Deception in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
405 and 76-6-412 and 1 count of Racketeering in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-10-1601. 
Terry moved to dismiss the Information on the grounds that the 
Director of the Division of Securities has the sole authority to enforce the 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and that the Director did not 
refer the case to the Utah County Attorney for prosecution, having obtained 
the relief he sought in a civil securities fraud case against Terry. 
The first hearing on the motion took place on September 25, 2000. (R. 
0957, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on Motions, Addendum 16) 
The Trial Court (Judge Lynn W. Davis) denied the motion to Dismiss. 
(R. 318-334, Addendum 17) 
The Court granted a second hearing on the motion. (Transcript of 
Proceedings, Hearing on Motions, Addendum 18) 
The Court again denied the motion. (R. 368, Addendum 19) 
This Court denied Terry's Petition for Leave to file an Interlocutory 
Appeal on this issue. 
Based upon the State's representation that the facts of the case were 
not in dispute, Terry filed a Motion to Suppress in which he alleged that 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 is unconstitutional for reasons which shall more 
fully hereinafter appear. 
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The State filed a Reply to the Motion to Suppress in which Terry's 
version of the facts was disputed. Terry sought and obtained an Order for 
Discovery to enable him to flesh out the facts on which he intended to rely in 
support of his Motion to Suppress. The State failed to comply with the Order 
for Discovery. Terry filed a Motion to Dismiss on that basis. 
The Trial Court (Judge Ray M. Harding Jr.) held a hearing on 
December 21, 2002, during which he considered the Motion to Dismiss and 
the Motion to Suppress. (R. 0959, Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, 
Addendum 20) 
Judge Harding denied the Motion to Suppress in his ruling of January 
18, 2002. (R. 641-656, Addendum 21) 
Terry filed a Motion to Make Additional Findings of Fact. (R. 685-
695) A hearing on the motion was held on April 24, 2002. (R. 0960, 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Make Additional Findings of Fact, 
Addendum 22) 
Judge Harding denied the motion in his ruling of April 25, 2002. (R. 
845-846, Addendum 23) 
Judge Harding was arrested for alleged drug possession and use soon 
thereafter and the case was assigned to Judge Gary D. Stott. 
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Terry filed a Motion for Review of all of Judge Harding's rulings on 
the grounds that the Judge's use of Heroin and Cocaine during the time he 
was considering the case severely impaired his cognitive abilities and that 
the proceedings before Judge Harding would be so fundamentally unfair as 
to violate Terry's due process rights under the Constitution of the State of 
Utah and the United States. 
Terry also asked the Court for leave to conduct discovery on the issue 
of Judge Harding's use of Heroin and Cocaine during the time he presided 
over the case. 
The Trial Court (Judge Gary D. Stott), having declined to hold a 
hearing on the matter, denied the Motion for Review and Terry's request for 
leave to conduct discovery on Judge Harding's drug use in his ruling of 
September 16, 2002. (R. 914-916, Addendum 24) 
This Court denied Terry's Petition for Leave to File an Interlocutory 
Appeal on the issues raised in the Motion to Suppress. 
On October 25, 2002, Terry entered no contest pleas to and was 
sentenced on six counts of Securities Fraud, three of which are Third Degree 
Felonies and three of which are Second Degree Felonies. (Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 
8, and 10 of the Information) All other counts recited in the Information 
were dismissed. 
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As a condition of the Plea Bargain, Terry was permitted to appeal the 
Trial Court's rulings on pretrial motions which he believes should have 
resulted in the dismissal of the case against him. 
On Terry's motion, and pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the 
Court entered an order staying execution of the sentence and certifying 
probable cause that there are meritorious issues which should be decided by 
the appellate court. (R. 0961-0968, Addendum 25) 
The Notice of Appeal in this case was filed on November 25, 2002. 
(R. 953-954, Addendum 26) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. From May 17, 1993 to July 8, 1998, Mark J. Griffin (Griffin) was 
the Director of the Division of securities of the Department of Commerce of 
the State of Utah. (R. 156) 
2. In March of 1995, Griffin authorized an investigation of Terry J. 
Stephenson, Grant Mills, and Soft-One Corporation to determine if they had 
violated the provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. (R. 155) 
3. Based upon the findings of the investigation, Griffin referred the 
case to the Utah Attorney GeneraPs Office to file a civil complaint. (R. 155, 
133-152) 
4. All of the issues in the civil case were resolved and settled pursuant 
to the provisions of a Stipulation for Judgment and Permanent Injunction 
and a Judgment and Permanent Injunction. (R. 155, 113-131) 
5. Griffin testified that "I do not recall referring this case for criminal 
prosecution of Terry J. Stephenson and Grant C. Mills." (R. 155) 
6. Griffin testified further: 
Q. When you did refer a case, did you send in written 
communication? Well, what was the process for referral? 
Verbal, written, how? 
A. Usually it was the same process that is present in any County 
or with any prosecutorial agency. You take your files down and 
you screen the case with either the prosecutor of the day or 
somebody who is a prosecutor that might specialize in the area. 
As far as a formal letter of referral or paper trail from the 
division, I did not institute that process in my administration. 
Q. So there would be no correspondence in your file in any way 
which had to reflect—or request to a prosecution agency? 
A. I wouldn't rule that out, but there was no formal requirement 
that we do that. 
(R. 0958, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on Motions, 
March 21, 2001, P. 9, Addendum 18) 
7. The County Attorney asserted in the State's Response to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss that "The Defendant claims that a client 
relationship is established between the Division of Securities and the County 
Attorney's office when a criminal charge is filed under this chapter. While 
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there might be some legitimacy to that argument when the charge is filed at 
the request of the director of the division, the di *ctor did not so request in 
the present case. This matter was instituted after an investigation done by the 
county attorney's office. There has never been a request from the division 
that prosecution be pursued." (R. 206) 
8. Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney General with the Attorney 
General's Office testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. You talked about in general that when a case is 
referred to your office you sit down with the representative 
from the Division of Securities and you kind of brainstorm the 
case, look at it and decide which action is appropriate to take; is 
that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Would that include also consideration whether or not to file 
criminal charges or the civil charges, is that kind of the thing 
you are looking at? 
A. That is a fair description. There may be situations where the 
Division thinks that this ought to be prosecuted criminally and 
we will say okay but here are some of the defenses and here is 
how the case law reads for this and we think that a—that it may 
be more difficult to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, but we 
feel very good about meeting the civil standard. 
Or there may be other cases where they will bring up a case and 
during the discussion with the agency we express the view that 
we think this is appropriate for criminal prosecution and indeed 
we would like to bring a criminal case. 
Q. So the conclusion that being the course of action has been 
then determined with the concurrence of both parties? 
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A. Well, we make an initial determination then and the 
investigator is going to go back to her supervisor in the 
Division of Securities and discuss it. I'm going to take it to my 
supervisor. And then we proceed along that course drafting the 
civil complaint letting the Division review it. But in the course 
of putting it together, there are times we change our mind. 
Q. Okay. And referring to this specific case, during the course 
of the civil prosecution you didn't change your mind to change 
it to a criminal prosecution? 
A. How do I answer that without—without disclosing 
confidences? 
In discussing this case, the decision from—the initial decision 
was made to bring it as a civil case and that determination did 
not change. (R. 0958, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on 
Motions, March 21, 2001, P.29-31, Addendum 18) 
9. Ellen Bloedel, an investigator for the Securities Division, had been 
investigating Terry for almost two years before Douglas Witney, Bureau 
Chief of the Investigation Division of the Utah County Attorney's Office, 
began his investigation. (R. 202, 0958, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing 
on Motions, March 21, 2001, P. 37, Addendum 18) 
10. Douglas Witney testified: 
Q. And if I understand your testimony correctly, what you are 
saying -is it fair to say that this prosecution from your 
standpoint is solely a determination by your office that to file a 
criminal charge, the securities violations, your decision—you 
didn't seek input? You got information from others, but the 
decision was made by the Utah County Attorney's Office, is 
that correct? 
12 
A. Our office had filed security charges before this and various 
other charges, so I would say that it was my decision along with 
Craig Madsen, the prosecuting attorney, that he wanted a 
certain amount of information set out and those were the 
charges that we would pursue. 
Q. And it didn't matter what the Division of Securities wanted 
to do with the case, this was your case, correct? 
A. It doesn't matter what another agency wants to do. If we 
choose to file charges we will file. (R. 0958, Transcript of 
Proceedings, Hearing on Motions, March 21, 2001, P. 44-45, 
Addendum 18) 
11. Ellen Bloedel, an investigator for the Securities Division, shared 
the evidence on which the Division relied in the civil case against Terry with 
the Utah County Attorney's Office. (R. 0958, Transcript of Proceedings, 
Hearing on Motions, March 21, 2001, P. 39, Addendum 18) 
12. On or about April 10, 1998, the Utah County Attorney, purporting 
to represent the State of Utah and the Utah Division of Securities, filed an 
Information, which mirrored the complaint filed in the civil case, charging 
Terry violations of the as outlined above. 
13. The parties agreed that it if Terry were to prevail on his Motion to 
Suppress, the State would not be able to proceed with the case. The parties 
initially believed that the facts on which they intended to rely to brief the 
Motion to Suppress were not in dispute. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing on 
Motion to Suppress, P. 3, 7 Addendum 20) 
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14. The parties' briefs revealed profound disputes of fact in the case. 
Terry offered the following facts in support of his Motion to Suppress and in 
his Memorandum in Response to the State's Brief: 
a. Stephenson, Mills and Soft-One Corporation were investigated by the 
Utah Division of Securities for violations of the Securities Act. 
b. The investigation was conducted by Ellen Bloedel a securities 
compliance investigator with the Division. 
c. The information obtained by Bloedel was obtained through the 
powers authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 pursuant to which 
she issued administrative subpoenas to produce documents and 
records and subpoenas which compelled the attendance of 
Stephenson, Mills, and others to testify under oath. 
d. Based upon the information obtained by the division, at the request 
of the Director, Mark Griffin, the Attorney general initiated a civil 
complaint alleging a violation of the Securities act. 
e. The civil complaint was based upon the information obtained by the 
division, which included a substantial amount of documents, 
records, and testimony provided by Stephenson, Mills and others 
pursuant to the investigative powers of the Division. 
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f. The allegations of the civil complaint mirror the allegations of the 
securities violations alleged in the criminal information filed in this 
case. 
g. The civil complaint, among other requests, sought the imposition of 
contempt charges for each of the alleged violations of the securities 
act. 
h. Based upon the information provided by Stephenson and Mills and 
the information obtained through the investigative powers of the 
Division, a stipulation for judgment was entered into by the State 
and Stephenson and Mills. 
i. A judgment upon the stipulations of Stephenson and Mills was 
entered by the court on March 23, 1997, in the case of Stephenson 
and on April 16, 1997, in the case of Mills. 
j . Utah County filed a petition for the investigation of criminal 
activities under the Subpoena Powers Act on March 24, 1997. 
k. The information sought under the Subpoena Powers Act was based 
upon information received from the division which was obtained 
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19. 
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1. The Utah County Attorneys' office did not file any copies of the 
information obtained by use of the subpoenas nor summaries of the 
results of the subpoenas. 
m. The bulk, if not all, of the documents obtained in this investigation 
relating to securities violations were either obtained directly by Ellen 
Bloedel of the Securities Division, or obtained as a result of the 
information provided by Bloedel to the Utah County investigators. 
n. Michael Hines, Director of Enforcement of the Utah Division of 
Securities submitted an affidavit in connection with earlier 
proceedings indicating that the Division had both civil and criminal 
enforcement in mind from the outset in the Division's investigation 
of Stephenson and Mills. In Paragraph 6 of the affidavit he stated 
that "It was always my intention that the Division would use a civil 
case to obtain a quick permanent injunction, so as to minimize the 
ongoing harm, and then follow up with a criminal prosecution of 
Mills and Stephenson." 
o. Judge Davis confirms this in his findings on the Motion to Dismiss 
wherein he found that the Attorney General's office, through Deputy 
Attorney General Wayne Klein, generally did not proceed with 
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separate civil and criminal actions simultaneously because of the 
potential intra-office evidentiary conflicts. (R. 569-572) 
15. The State disputed the foregoing facts and recited its own version 
of the facts. 
a. The Utah County Attorneys' Office first learned of the current 
allegations from David and Craig Smith, as well as Guy Pribill and 
other concerned citizens, and investigated this case for several weeks 
before making contact with the Utah Division of Securities. 
b. Although the Utah Division of Securities did turn over records 
obtained in the civil action, the majority of the documents obtained by 
the Utah County Attorneys' Office were entirely independent of work 
done by the Utah Division of Securities. 
c. Mills was represented by counsel in the civil case. 
d. Second, the Division has no "criminal investigators." The Division is 
not a criminal agency of any kind; it is strictly an administrative 
agency. So when defendants opine that a "criminal investigation may 
be conducted and evidence of potential criminal violations 
obtained..." they simply misunderstand the role of the division. The 
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Division does not conduct criminal investigations and plainly did not 
do so in this case. The record in this case clearly reflects the fact that 
the Division was conducting an administrative and/or civil 
investigation. 
e. The point is that the UCAO had an active and independent 
investigation under way before receiving any of these documents. 
f. The defense disputes the number and nature of the administrative 
subpoenas served on Stephenson and Mills. (R. 572-573) 
16. Judge Harding's action on the fact dispute and the aftermath: 
a. The Court entered an Order compelling compliance by October 12, 
2001, with previous discovery requests submitted by Stephenson and 
Mills. 
b. Counsel for Stephenson and Mills associated attorney Francis J. 
Nielson to review the records recited in the Order and he delivered the 
Order to S. Anthony Taggart, Director, Division of Securities, on 
October 5, 2001. 
c. Taggart did not recall having been served with a Subpoena Duces 
Tecum and advised that, other than a small folder, he did not have the 
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records requested. He speculated that the records may have been 
transferred to the Attorney General. 
d. Notwithstanding Taggart's lapse of memory, he responded to the 
Subpoena Duces Tecum on March 19, 2001. 
e. The Order for Discovery was delivered to Wayne Klein, Assistant 
Attorney General, on October 5, 2001. 
f. Klein outlined his reasons why he would not permit Stephenson and 
Mills to review any files of the Attorney General in a letter dated 
October 9, 2001. 
g. Access to the records of the Division of Securities and the Attorney 
General was not given to Stephenson and Mills by October 12, 2001, 
as ordered by the court or at all. 
h. The Division of Securities and the Attorney General have not 
explained to the Court why access to the records was not possible and 
have filed no objections with the Court to any portion of the Order for 
Discovery. (R. 587-589, 547-567) 
16. Terry filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the States failure to 
comply with the Discovery Order. (R. 569-594) 
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17. A hearing on the Motion to Suppress and the Motion to Dismiss 
were scheduled for December 21. 2001. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearings, 
Addendum 20) 
18. The parties and the Court addressed the Motion to Dismiss. The 
Utah County Attorney objected to the hearing on the Motion to dismiss. 
THE COURT: Okay. Are you prepared to argue the motion to dismiss 
today? It wasn't really noticed today, but— 
MR. WAYMENT: I am. I've told counsel I more or less (inaudible). I 
object to it. The Court will remember we were here earlier on a plea 
bargain. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. WAYMENT: An in terms of that plea bargain there was going to 
be one motion that was going to be argued before this Court before 
the plea and that was the motion to suppress. 
I think that it's undisputed at this time that the Securities Division has 
turned over whatever they've got. They didn't have much, and I think 
it's not within either the spirit or the letter of the plea bargain to go 
ahead with a motion to dismiss at this point, and frankly I've told Mr. 
Carter I don't feel like I'm being dealt with in good faith to have this 
extra motion brought up at this time. 
THE, COURT: Have I provided anyone the -well, I did provide oral 
argument on motions, is the way I termed it, didn't I? 
MR. ESPLIN: Yeah, and that's the way - 1 did not (inaudible) 
because that covered all the motions. 
THE COURT: I'll hear both motions. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing 
on Motion to Suppress, P.2-3, Addendum 20) 
20 
19. Mr. Esplin advised the Court that the Utah County Attorney had 
stipulated to the facts recited in the Motion to Suppress, that when the 
State's brief was filed, the stipulation was not adhered to, that, instead, the 
State claimed that the Utah County Attorney's Office had generated the bulk 
of the evidence used to prosecute Terry, that many other disputed facts were 
raised, that this dispute could not be resolved because the State would not 
provide the documents as ordered and that unless the State would stipulate to 
the facts recited in the Motion to Suppress, the hearing on the Motion to 
Dismiss should proceed. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing on Motion to 
Suppress, P. 3-6, Addendum 20) 
20. Mr. Esplin advised the Court of the condition on which he would 
agree that a resolution of the Motion to Suppress would render the discovery 
issue moot. 
THE COURT: But as long as their position is consistent in terms of 
the motion to suppress, you would agree that it's a moot issue as to 
discovery at this point? 
MR. ESPLIN: Yes, if they stipulate and agree that the investigation 
materials primarily came either directly from the Division or as a 
result of information provided by the Division through their 
investigation and their subpoena. I think it is moot. 
THE COURT: Would you agree with that, Mr. Carter? 
MR. CARTER: I agree with that, yes. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing 
on Motion to Suppress, P. 6, Addendum 20) 
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21. The parties entered into a stipulation on this point. 
THE COURT: And I guess that's the point with—let me ask you this 
Mr. Esplin. If the State were to stipulate that for purposes—for all 
purposes relating to the motion to suppress, that the granting of the 
motion to suppress would be determinative to the case and would 
prohibit the State from going forward, would that be sufficient for you 
to withdraw your motion to dismiss? 
MR. ESPLIN: Yes, I can stipulate to that. 
THE COURT: Do you so stipulate? 
MR. WAYMENT: Yes. I think it would be impossible for the State to 
prove that the evidence we otherwise developed was truly 
independent. I don't think we could carry that burden, and so we 
couldn't really get past the fruit of the poisonous tree argument, and it 
would be dispositive of the whole case, I think. 
THE COURT: Then do you accept the stipulation on behalf of-
MR. CARTER: I do. On behalf of Mr. Stephenson we agree. 
THE COURT: All right. Then the motion—do you each agree, then, 
that the motion to dismiss, would you like it withdrawn or rendered 
moot? 
MR.CARTER: I think it's probably determined moot based upon— 
MR. ESPLIN: Based on the stipulation. 
THE COURT: Moot based upon the stipulation? 
MR. WAYMENT: That's fine. 
THE COURT; All right, that's the stipulation. That will now be the 
order as to the motion to dismiss. That having been disposed of, why 
don't we now turn to the motion to suppress, and we'll hear your 
arguments there. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing on Motion to 
Suppress P. 7-8, Addendum 20) 
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22. Judge Harding denied the Motion to Suppress in his written ruling 
of January 18, 2002. (R. 641-656, Addendum 21) 
23. Terry filed a document entitled Defendant's Argument 
Referencing Contested Findings in which he requested the Court to make 
additional findings of fact. (R. 686-695) 
24. The State's Argument Referencing Contested Findings was filed 
in reply. (R. 676-684) 
25. Terry filed Defendant's Reply to State's Argument Referencing 
Contested Findings. (816-839) 
26. The Court held a hearing on the Defendant's Argument 
Referencing Contested Findings on April 24, 2002. (R. 0960, Transcript of 
Hearing on Defendant's Argument Referencing Contested Findings, 
Addendum 22) 
27. The Court denied the relief sought in his written ruling of April 25, 
2002. (R. 845-846, Addendum 23) 
28.Terry filed a Motion for Review and Reversal of the Honorable 
Ray M. Harding Jr.' Rulings on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion to 
Suppress, and Motion Requesting Findings of Fact, and for a Stay of All 
Further Proceedings Pending a Disposition of the Motion. 
Defendants also asked the Court for" leave to conduct discovery on 
the issue of Judge Harding's alleged impairment at the time he considered 
Defendants' motions." (R. 859-861) 
A memorandum in support of the motion was filed with the motion. 
(R. 864-883) 
A lengthy Addendum containing all proceedings before Judge 
Harding was filed with the motion and memorandum for consideration of the 
successor judge, in this case, Judge Gary D. Scott. (R. 863) 
29. The State filed its Opposition to Motion for Review. (R. 889-896) 
30. Terry filed his Reply to State's Opposition to Motion for Review. 
(R. 897-913) 
31. Terry filed a Motion for Hearing on Defendants' Motion for 
Review, for Consideration of Supplemental Documents Submitted in support 
of Motion for Review and Objection to Ruling. (R. 917-937) 
32. Judge Harding was arrested on Saturday, July 7, 2002, for alleged 
drug possession and use and spent the weekend in the Toole County Jail. 
Terry obtained the Court Docket, Search Warrant, Affidavit in Support of 
and Request for Search warrant, Return of Search Warrant, and a Property 
Report describing the items seized pursuant to the Search Warrant. He 
attached these documents to his Motion for Hearing on Defendants' Motion 
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for Review for consideration by Judge Harding's successor. (R. 917-932, 
Addendum 27) 
33. Judge Stott declined to grant a hearing on the Motion for Review, 
and denied the motion in his written ruling of September 16, 2002. (R. 914-
916, Addendum 26) 
34. This Appeal ensued. (R. 953-954, Addendum 24) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. 
Proceedings before Judge Harding, if he were under the influence 
of, or materially impaired by, the use of cocaine and heroin, 
would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process under 
the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States? 
On July 13, 2002, the Alpine/Highland Police Department and the 
Utah County Sheriffs Department were asked to respond to Judge 
Harding's residence in Highland Utah. The Utah County dispatch had 
received a call from Ann Harding at 07:31 hours on that date in which she 
stated that she needed help at her residence because her husband, Ray M. 
Harding Jr., "had been using drugs all night long and that he was acting out 
of her control." 
When the officers arrived at the home, they found the judge standing 
in the front door, staggering. One of the deputies stated that "Judge 
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Harding's motor skills were very shaky and that he was unsteady on his 
feet." 
The Affidavit in support of and Request for Search warrant recites 
that one of the Troopers observed: "poor balance, slow speech, and that with 
the police presence currently there, Ray M. Harding has fallen asleep. All 
these, according to trooper Jorgensen, are indicative of an individual under 
the influence of a controlled substance." 
This event occurred less than three months after Judge Harding ruled 
on one of Terry's motions. 
The science on the use of cocaine and heroin is well established. The 
Court should take judicial notice that one is not only cognitively impaired at 
the moment of use but for days, weeks and years thereafter. This issue was 
raised in Terry's Memorandum in support of Motion for Review. (R. 882, 
also see scientific articles on this issue, Addendum 28) 
In Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001), the Court 
summed it when it opined, "Ones legal conscience simply recoils at the 
shocking thought that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is satisfied by a judge presiding over a criminal trial and making life or death 
sentencing decisions while under the influence of, or materially impaired by, 
the use of an illegal mind-altering substance. Such proceedings before a 
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mentally incompetent judge would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate 
federal due process under the Constitution... 
II. 
The defendant is entitled to conduct discovery to determine the 
scope, duration, extent and nature of the alleged use of cocaine 
and heroin by Judge Harding when he was considering 
Defendant's case and the extent to which he may have been 
impaired at that time? 
Terry asserted in the Trial Court that Judge Harding's intellectual and 
cognitive abilities were compromised by his drug use when he was 
considering his motions and that this impairment deprived him of a fair 
opportunity to present his case. (R. 881) 
Specifically, Terry and the State had an understanding that the State 
would stipulate to the facts recited in his Motion to Suppress. On that basis, 
Terry gave up the right to proceed with his Motion to Dismiss for discovery 
violations. The State reneged on the agreement and Judge Harding refused to 
enforce it even though the record was clear on that issue. He then proceeded 
to find his own facts on which he based his denial of Terry's Motion to 
Suppress. 
Judge Harding entered a sweeping discovery order and then refused 
to enforce it. He refused to permit Terry to clear up the disputes of fact in the 
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case. A dark cloud of suspicion was left hanging over Judge Harding's head 
because of his erratic rulings. 
In support of his request to conduct discovery on Judge Harding's 
drug use while he was considering Terry's case, he submitted the Court 
Docket, Search Warrant, Affidavit in Support of and Request for Search 
Warrant, Return of Search Warrant, and a Property Report describing the 
items seized pursuant to the search Warrant to Judge Stott for his 
consideration. Judge Stott summarily denied the request for discovery 
stating it would be nothing but a "fishing expedition." 
III. 
The court incorrectly ruled that a criminal investigation pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a) is not subject to a defendant's 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure. 
The Supreme Court has recognized only two methods of investigating 
a criminal case. One is authorized under the provisions of the grand jury 
statutes. The second method is pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act. 
The Subpoena Powers Act mandates that a district court objectively 
determines that good cause has been shown for the investigation, that a 
subpoena may be issued only after the investigating officer has made a good 
faith determination that the evidence being sought is relevant to the 
authorized investigation and that a person to whom a subpoena has been 
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issued must be afforded an opportunity to challenge the subpoena prior to 
compliance. 
The evidence obtained by the Securities Division pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-19(1) (a) does not meet any of the conditions required by 
the court. 
IV. 
The trial court incorrectly found Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a) 
constitutional when it does not provide any constitutional 
protections for a defendant in a criminal investigation. 
The Supreme Court has held that the government's authority to 
investigate criminal activity is subject to the Fourth Amendment rights of a 
defendant or potential defendant. There are no Fourth Amendment 
protections set forth in the Securities Act. 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-19 grants powers which are normally 
restricted by judicial review and which are limited only by the investigator's 
subjective determination, which is not subject to review, of relevancy. 
The government is free to disregard all of the rights of potential 
defendants under the Fourth Amendment if the evidence obtained in this 
case is allowed to be used in this criminal prosecution. 
V. 
The court incorrectly interpreted the discovery provisions of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it permitted the evidence 
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gathered in civil discovery proceedings to be used in a criminal 
case. 
Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney General with the attorney General's 
Office testified in this case about the difficulties inherent in the process of 
gathering evidence using the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which may be 
used improperly to gain information for the criminal process. He opined that 
information which is intended to be used in a criminal prosecution should be 
obtained through criminal subpoenas. 
He stated that it was not his practice to handle a criminal case and a 
civil case against the same person at the same time. 
He further stated that if the government is obtaining information 
pursuant to civil discovery, or administrative subpoenas, and a criminal case 
is ongoing, it raises the issue of whether or not there are parallel 
proceedings. (R. 0958, P. 28-29, Addendum 18) 
The evidence which was obtained in the civil investigation and later 
used in the criminal case was obtained in violation of the defendants' rights 
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. This evidence should be 
suppressed as "fruit of the poisoned tree." 
VI. 
The court incorrectly interpreted Article V Section 1 of the Utah 
State Constitution when it ruled that the grant of authority to 
investigate criminal violations under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 
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does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers and that the statute is therefore constitutional. 
The core judicial function of review and control over subpoena 
process as well as the judicial oversight of the criminal investigation 
authority has been delegated by statute to the Division of Securities. This 
delegation is unconstitutional and the statute should be declared 
unconstitutional. All evidence obtained through the unconstitutional 
delegation of judicial duties should be suppressed. 
VII. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fifth Amendment and 
Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution when it ruled that the use 
of the investigative powers of the Division of Securities to obtain 
evidence to be used in criminal prosecution did not violate the 
defendant's right against self incrimination guaranteed by those 
constitutions. 
A citizen's right to the privilege against self-incrimination applies to 
both civil and criminal investigations. 
Terry's rights against self-incrimination were violated by compelling 
him to provide documents and statements to the Division of Securities 
without Miranda protection. 
The subpoenas served on Terry which required his attendance and 
production of documents to the Division of Securities did not indicate that 
he was a "target" of the investigation. 
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Based upon compliance with the subpoenas Terry provided 
incriminatory statements, documents and other information which was used 
in the civil proceeding and then turned over for use in this criminal matter. 
VIII. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 24 of the 
Utah State Constitution when it held that Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
19 does not violate those constitutional provisions and is therefore 
facially constitutional. 
The Supreme Court has held that persons investigated pursuant to 
either the grand jury statutes or the Criminal Subpoena Act enjoy equal 
protection of the law since both methods of investigation contain basically 
equivalent safeguards against unwarranted prosecutorial misconduct or 
intrusion. 
In this case, those investigated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 
clearly denied equal protection since the act does not contain the 
constitutional protections which both the grand jury system and the 
subpoena powers system embody. 
IX. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fourth Amendment 
Due Process Clause and Article I §§ 7 & 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution when it ruled that the Division's investigation did not 
need to comply with the requirements of the Subpoena Powers 
Act or the Grand Jury Act. 
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Investigators from the Division of Securities need not show that there 
is probable cause or to be able to articulate a suspicion before requiring a 
person to produce private documents, physical evidence, or to appear and 
testify. 
The Division of Securities is given carte Blanche authority to compel 
citizens to subject themselves to an investigation in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 is 
both facially unconstitutional and is unconstitutional as applied in this case. 
X. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the parties' stipulation, 
pursuant to which the defendants believed they gave up the right 
to argue their Motion to Dismiss in exchange for the state's 
agreement to accept the defendant's version of the facts, when it 
ruled that there was no such agreement 
A Motion to suppress is fact sensitive and fact driven. The parties in 
this case seemed to believe there were no disputes about the facts as they 
related to Terry's Motion to Suppress and Terry proceeded accordingly. 
The briefs submitted in support of the parties' various positions 
revealed broad disagreements on the facts of the case. The Court recognized 
this dilemma initially and entered a sweeping discovery order requiring the 
State to produce documents which would clarify the dispute. 
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The State determined that they could not or would not comply with 
the discovery order which was based on the State's failure to comply with a 
subpoena issued pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 14. The documents, Terry 
learned, had disappeared. Terry filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the 
State's noncompliance. 
Terry agreed to forego the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss if the 
State would stipulate to the facts recited in the Motion to Suppress. The 
stipulation was entered into in open court and the parties proceeded to argue 
the Motion to Suppress. 
Judge Harding ignored the stipulated facts in his decision on the 
Motion to Suppress and generated his own findings of fact. 
The record clearly reflects he erred in that regard and by doing so 
deprived Terry of the opportunity proceed with a meritorious Motion to 
Dismiss. The state had lost the documents described in the discovery order 
and the case should have been dismissed. 
XI. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the applicable provisions of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act when it held that, even without a 
referral of the case by the Securities Division, the Utah County 
Attorney had the standing and authority to investigate and 
prosecute defendants for violations of the act. 
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The Utah Uniform Securities Act mandates that the Director of the 
Division of Securities shall be responsible for the administration and 
enforcement of the act. He is authorized to conduct investigations to 
determine whether any person has violated any provision of the Act. 
The Act gives the Director the sole authority to make enforcement 
decisions relating to civil or criminal remedies which may be available. He 
must first determine whether he wishes to initiate a criminal prosecution. If 
he determines to proceed with a criminal prosecution he may elect to refer 
the matter to the Utah Attorney General or a County Attorney or District 
Attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction who shall provide all legal services 
for the Division and its staff. 
The Utah County Attorney cannot investigate or prosecute violations 
of the Securities unless he is specifically requested to do so by the Director 
of the Division. 
The Director of the Division of Securities did not refer this case to the 
Utah County Attorney for a criminal investigation and prosecution. The 
Utah County Attorney has no standing or authority to prosecute this case and 
it should have been dismissed for that reason. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Proceedings before Judge Harding, if he were under the influence 
of, or materially impaired by, the use of cocaine and heroin, 
would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process under 
the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States? 
Judge Harding was assigned to this case shortly after March 23, 2001. 
He presided over the case until April 25, 2002, the date on which he handed 
down his last decision. 
The Judge's drug problems surfaced in a public way during the early 
part of July, 2002. Terry asserted in the proceedings to review Judge 
Harding's rulings that the Judge's demeanor, lack of concentration, his 
physical appearance, his inability to follow oral arguments, among other 
things while on the bench, were apparent well before July, 2002. (R. 910) 
This Court recently stated in State v. Law, 2003 WL 21512555 (Utah 
App.) that uAn appellate court's review is...limited to the evidence 
contained in the record on appeal" (citation omitted) 
The record on appeal in this case contains the Court Docket, Search 
Warrant, Affidavit in Support of and Request for Search Warrant, Return of 
Search Warrant, and a Property Report describing the items seized pursuant 
to the Search Warrant, all of which was given to Jude Harding's successor 
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for his consideration in connection with Terry's Motion for Review of Judge 
Harding's rulings. 
Forty items are described in the Property Report clearly showing 
Judge Harding's drug use as of that date, less than three months after he 
ruled in Terry's case. 
Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001), Summerlin v. 
Stewart, 281 F.3d 836 (9 Cir.2002) addresses the impairment of a judge 
caused by his use of marijuana during pretrial, trial, and sentencing 
proceedings. 
Warren Wesley Summerlin was convicted in 1982 in an Arizona 
Superior Court for first degree murder and sexual assault and was sentenced 
to death by Philip Marquardt, an Arizona Superior Court Judge. Following 
affirmance of his convictions, Summerlin sought habeas corpus relief. 
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied 
relief, but issued a certificate of probable cause enabling Summerlin to 
appeal. 
Summerlin raised six issues on appeal, one of which was that the trial 
judge's alleged use of and addiction to marijuana during pre-trial, trial, and 
sentencing proceedings, as evidenced by the judge's admission of addiction 
and felony conviction in 1991 of a marijuana crime, deprived Summerlin of 
due process of law. Judge Marquardt pleaded guilty in 1991 in Arizona to a 
felony involving a conspiracy to possess marijuana and admitted to suffering 
from an addiction to the drug. This was his second conviction involving the 
use of marijuana. Id. at P. 949. 
In Summertin, the Court quoted Shakespeare: 
He who the sword of heaven will bear 
should be as holy as severe 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
MEASURE FOR MEASURE 
Act 3, sc. 2 
M a t P. 948 
The Court in Summerlin cited two cases for the proposition that "due 
process implies a tribunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford a 
hearing." Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 32 S.Ct. 651, 56 L.Ed. 
1038 (1912). (emphasis added) Tannery. United States, 483 U.S. at 110, 
107 S.Ct. 2739. 
We conclude from Jordan 9s and Tanner's articulations of a 
defendant's right to a mentally competent tribunal that 
Summerlin had a clearly established constitutional right in 1982 
to have his trial presided over, and his sentence of life or death 
determined by, a judge who was not under the influence of, or 
materially impaired by, a mind-altering illegal substance such 
as marijuana... 
One's legal conscience simply recoils at the shocking thought 
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
satisfied by a judge presiding over a criminal trial and making 
life or death sentencing decisions while under the influence of, 
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or materially impaired by, the use of an illegal mind-altering 
substance. Such proceedings before a mentally incompetent 
judge would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal 
due process under the Constitution. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 
F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995). "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 
133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) Id at P. 950 and 
951. 
In Summerlin, a federal habeas action, the Court held that the 
petitioner "is entitled as a matter of law to an evidentiary hearing on a claim 
of constitutional deprivation if he can meet both parts of a two-prong test." 
First the petitioner must tender a colorable allegation which, if 
proved, would entitle him to relief, [citation omitted). ("To be 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas action, the 
petitioner must first make allegations which, if proved, would 
entitle him to relief.") 
Second, he must demonstrate that the facts are in dispute, and 
that through no fault of his own, they were not adequately 
developed for the record in the state court, [citation omitted] 
("Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court to which a 
habeas corpus petition is made must grant an evidentiary 
hearing if the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in 
a hearing in a state court, either at the time of trial or in a 
collateral proceeding.") (emphasis added) [citations omitted] 
(federal evidentiary hearing warranted where petitioner took all 
steps to develop facts, but state court deprived him of the 
opportunity to do so). 
M a t P. 951 
The court noted in Summerlin that the facts surrounding the matter 
were never fully developed in state court. The court concluded " 
Summerlin's specific and uncontroverted factual allegations against Judge 
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Marquardt in the district court amount in the aggregate to a colorable 
"reason to believe" that this defendant may have been deprived of his 
constitutional right to a competent tribunal" and that "accordingly, this 
showing entitled him to both funds to investigate this matter and to an 
evidentiary hearing in order to develop the connection, if any, between the 
judge's chronic use of illegal drugs, his alleged addiction, and his 
performance during this case as a judge." Id. at P. 953. 
The "reason to believe" standard sounds a lot like our probable cause 
test used in preliminary hearings, justification for a search warrant, and 
determining the appropriateness of bail. 
The scathing dissent in Summerlin worried first that "we are opening 
the floodgates to literally thousands of prisoners who will now tender the-
judge-was-under-the-influence habeas claims against Judge Marquardt and 
others and seek corresponding evidentiary hearings." Id. at P. 954. 
"Second, our colleague claims we are ordering what amounts to 
"rummaging" through Judge Marquardt's "private life" and that we are 
unfairly condemning him to a future spent in "small, poorly lit rooms, giving 
depositions about whether or not he was smoking pot in his office hours..." 
Id at P. 954. 
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Taking its lead from Bracy v. Gramley 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 
138, L.Ed. 2d 97 (1997), the court respectfully disagreed. 
In the main, we trust that with the evidentiary rules requiring 
relevancy, the district court will be able in the exercise of its 
discretion to keep the hearing focused on the judge's 
performance of his official duties in connection with this trial 
and this sentence. This said, we respectfully disagree with 
Judge Kozinski's assertion that we are unleashing the furies 
upon our justice system. We do not contemplate, nor should the 
district court allow, a free-for-all foray into Judge Marquardt's 
truly private behavior. 
Id. at P. 954. 
The court went on to say that "On the other hand, if the district court 
should determine that Judge Marquardt was unimpaired and clear-headed, 
the foul air surrounding this death sentence will have been cleared." Id. at P. 
955. 
Alexander Hamilton described our independent judiciary as 
"the citadel of the public justice and the public security," 
calling judges the 'guardians of the Constitution." THE 
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). This pivotal role 
was also described by Hamilton in that seminal work as the 
"least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution" 
because it has "not influence over either the sword or the 
purse..." Id. But, if judges are bereft of those normal sources of 
governmental power, what do they have at their disposal "to 
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the 
law?" Id. "Judgment," said Hamilton, "merely Judgment..." Id. 
The experts tell us that we can tolerate a certain number of 
insignificant parts of arsenic in our drinking water and a certain 
irreducible number of insect parts in our edible grain supplies, 
but we need not, similarly tolerate a single drug addicted jurist 
whose judgment is impaired, especially in a case involving life 
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and death decisions. Neither should we put to death any 
prisoner so condemned by such a wayward judge. Id. at P. 955. 
"Certainly if it is a crime to drive a car while under the influence of 
marijuana because the driver's judgment is impaired, we ought not permit 
judges who are under the influence to decide if a person lives or dies." 
(Barry Tarlow, National Association of Defense Lawyers article, August 
2002) 
II. 
The defendant is entitled to conduct discovery to determine the 
scope, duration, extent and nature of the alleged use of cocaine 
and heroin by Judge Harding when he was considering 
Defendant's case and the extent to which he may have been 
impaired at that time? 
In Terry's Reply to State's Opposition to Motion for Review, he 
outlined the reason's why he is entitled to discovery and an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of Judge Harding's drug use while he was presiding 
over his case. (R. 897-905) 
The record on appeal reflects that Chief Justice Durham recited in the 
administrative Order that the Court had "received information concerning 
the arrest of Judge Ray Harding, Jr. and "exercising the inherent authority of 
the Supreme Court to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the 
judiciary," ordered Judge Harding "suspended from presiding over any cases 
or proceedings pending a determination of whether information will be 
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forthcoming under Utah Code Ann. § 78-8-104 (Addendum 14) relating to 
potential administrative leave for Judge Ray Harding, Jr." 
Terry provided Judge Stott with the results of the search of the home 
of Judge Harding. 
The Utah Attorney General's Office now has a complete file on the 
investigation of Judge Harding as does the Judicial Conduct Commission. 
Terry should now be entitled to review these files to determine if they 
contain evidence of drug use by the Judge during the time he was 
considering Terry's case. 
III. 
The court incorrectly ruled that a criminal investigation pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a) is not subject to a defendant's 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against the government's 
unreasonable searches or seizures and against the arbitrary governmental 
intrusion through the exercise of subpoena powers. Katz v, U.S. 389 U.S. 
347. 
The Supreme Court has recognized two alternative methods of 
investigating a criminal case. One is authorized under the provisions of the 
grand jury statutes, Utah Code Ann. §77-10a-l to 77~10a-20. The second 
method is pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1 
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to 11'-22-5. In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 754 P. 2d 633 (Utah 
1998) at P. 657. 
The court imposed restrictions upon investigations conducted under 
the act in requiring the following conditions: 
1. The overall investigation may be approved only after a district 
court has made an objective determination that good cause has 
been shown. 
2. Each individual subpoena may be issued only after the 
investigating office has made a good faith determination that 
the testimony or other evidence being sought is reasonably 
relevant to the authorized investigation. 
3. A person to whom a subpoena has been issued must be afforded 
an opportunity to challenge the subpoena at some time prior to 
compliance. The authorizing court has the power to entertain 
motions to quash any individual subpoena that does not meet an 
objective standard of reasonableness when measured against the 
good cause showing made in the application for investigation. 
The investigative power of the Division of Securities, a part of the 
executive branch, is subject to no objective review by a judicial entity as 
required by the Supreme Court in In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 
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The use of evidence obtained by the Division of Securities under Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violatt Terry's right against unreasonable search and 
seizure and should be suppressed. 
IV. 
The trial court incorrectly found Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a) 
constitutional when it does not provide any constitutional 
protections for a defendant in a criminal investigation. 
In Zissi v. State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 157 (Utah 1992), the Utah 
Supreme Court found that the Utah Stamp Act, which required persons in 
possession of controlled substances to obtain a tax stamp through the tax 
commission, was facially unconstitutional, because it required a person to 
give evidence against himself which could subject the person to criminal 
prosecution. However, the court ruled that the statute could be saved by 
imposing a condition upon the use of the information obtained. The 
condition imposed by the court was that prosecutors could not use any 
information obtained by compliance with the Stamp Act in any prosecution. 
Terry maintains that all evidence which was obtained by the Division 
in the Division's civil investigation was obtained in violation of his rights to 
be free from unreasonable search and seizure and should be suppressed as 
"fruit of the poisoned tree." 
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V. 
The court incorrectly interpreted the discovery provisions of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it permitted the evidence 
gathered in civil discovery proceedings to be used in a criminal 
case. 
The Attorney general' Office has eschewed parallel prosecutions of 
the same person at the same time for civil and criminal matters. The 
information obtained in civil discovery proceedings should not be used in a 
criminal prosecution. This is one of the reasons the Division of Securities 
elected not to commence a criminal case against Terry. 
Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney General with the Attorney General's 
office was refreshingly forthcoming regarding this issue in his testimony at a 
hearing on Terry's Motion to Dismiss on March 21, 2001. 
Q. Okay. And referring to this specific case, during the course of the 
civil prosecution you didn't change your mind to change it to a 
criminal prosecution? 
A. How do I answer that without—disclosing confidences? 
In discussing this case, the decision from—the initial decision was 
made to bring it as a civil case and that determination did not change> 
(R. 0958, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing of Motions, March 21, 
2001, P. 29-31, Addendum 18) 
VI. 
The court incorrectly interpreted Article V Section 1 of the Utah 
State Constitution when it ruled that the grant of authority to 
investigate criminal violations under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 
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does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers and that the statute is therefore constitutional. 
Article V Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah prohibits 
the legislative branch or the executive branch from taking over judicial 
functions. The judicial function at issue is the review and enforcement of the 
subpoena power. The power may not be wholly delegated to a non-judicial 
officer to ensure that the judicial process is not abused. State v. Gallion, 572 
P. 2d 683 (Utah 1997) 
In the present case, the core judicial function of review and control 
over the subpoena process as well as judicial oversight of the criminal 
investigation authority has been delegated by statute to the Division of 
Securities. Such a delegation is unconstitutional. 
VII. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fifth Amendment and 
Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution when it ruled that the use 
of the investigative powers of the Division of Securities to obtain 
evidence to be used in criminal prosecution did not violate the 
defendant's right against self incrimination guaranteed by those 
constitutions. 
Defendants' right against self incrimination were violated by the use 
of the investigative authority of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19. In the case of In 
the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, supra, the Court ruled that a citizen's 
Al 
right to the privilege against self incrimination applies to both civil and 
criminal investigations. At 633 P.2d 645, the Court noted: 
Although both federal and Utah constitutions refer to the 
availability of the privilege in the context of criminal cases, 
under both the privilege has been held to be available in any 
proceeding conducted by the government, civil or criminal, 
investigatory or adjudicatory, so long as an answer might 
incriminate the witness and a possibility exists that a criminal 
action may be filed or a criminal conviction secured, (citations 
omitted) 
The use of the investigatory powers of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 to 
obtain information which is used in a criminal prosecution clearly violates 
the defendants' right against self incrimination and evidence obtained 
thereby, including any derivative evidence, should be suppressed. 
VIII. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 24 of the 
Utah State Constitution when it held that Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
19 does not violate those constitutional provisions and is therefore 
facially constitutional. 
Utah code Ann. §61-1-19 violates the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 24 of the Utah State Constitution and 
is therefore facially unconstitutional. It creates a system of investigation of 
criminal activities which is separate from and unequal to those investigations 
carried out under the grand jury statutes or the Criminal Subpoena Powers 
Act. 
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Those accused of crimes involving securities fraud who are 
investigated by the Division of Securities as opposed to a County Attorney 
or the Attorney General, are a class of citizens who are being denied equal 
protection of law and uniform operation of law. United States v. Batchelder, 
442 U.S. 114(1979) 
IX. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fourth Amendment 
Due Process Clause and Article I §§ 7 & 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution when it ruled that the Division's investigation did not 
need to comply with the requirements of the Subpoena Powers 
Act or the Grand Jury Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violates the Fourth Amendment Due 
Process Clause and Article I §§ 7 & 14 by the issuance of compulsory 
process without prior judicial process. 
In US v. O'Conner, 118 F. Supp. 248, at 250-51 (D. Mass. 1953), the 
court held that a government law enforcement agent could not circumvent 
the grand jury by using a subpoena to compel a person to testify concerning 
a possible criminal violation. It seems clear that the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-19 allow criminal investigators in the State of Utah to do just 
that. 
X. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the parties5 stipulation, 
pursuant to which the defendants believed they gave up the right 
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to argue their Motion to Dismiss in exchange for the state's 
agreement to accept the defendant's version of the facts, when it 
ruled that there was no such agreement. 
Oral argument on Terry's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of the 
State's discovery violations and Motion to Suppress was scheduled for 
December 21, 2001. Terry insisted that the State had agreed to accept his 
version of the facts for purposes of the Motion to Suppress. The State 
disagreed. 
Judge Harding enunciated a stipulation to settle the dispute to which 
the parties agreed on the record. 
THE COURT: .. .let me ask you this Mr. Esplin. If the State were to 
stipulate that for purposes—for all purposes relating to the motion to 
suppress, that the granting of the motion to suppress would be 
determinative to the case and would prohibit the State from going 
forward, would that be sufficient for you to withdraw your motion to 
dismiss? (Emphasis added) (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing on Motion 
to Suppress, P. 7, Addendum 20) 
The language, "for all purposes relating to the motion to suppress", in 
the context of the heated dispute about the facts, must be interpreted to mean 
that the State had now agreed to accept the version of the facts recited in the 
Motion to Suppress. 
The State stipulated to the Defendants' version of the facts. The 
Defendants gave up their right to argue the Motion to Dismiss. The State 
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dodged a bullet on its discovery violations. The Defendants now had a 
factual framework within which they could argue the Motion to Suppress. 
Judge Harding then proceeded to ignore the stipulation of the parties 
and found his own facts which he used in support of his ruling denying the 
Motion to Suppress. 
MR. CARTER: Well, maybe we misinterpreted that. The trouble-you do 
reference "consistent in the terms of the motion to suppress," because we've 
got this factual--
THE COURT: I can tell you that's not what I meant. What you are implying 
from that statement is not what the Court meant nor intended. I can tell you 
that and I want that on the record. 
MR CARTER: That's the way it was received, Judge. We have never had an 
evidentiary hearing on this in any form. We kind of agreed, from our 
understanding, of what the facts would be as set out in the motion to 
suppress. Now we come here, and we're kind of lost because I don't know 
where we're at on the facts. (R. 0960, Transcript of Hearing on Motion to 
Find Additional Facts, P. 16-17, Addendum 22) 
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The trial court incorrectly interpreted the applicable provisions of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act when it held that, even without a 
referral of the case by the Securities Division, the Utah County 
Attorney had the standing and authority to investigate and 
prosecute defendants for violations of the act. 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-13 charges the Director of the Division of 
Securities with the administration and enforcement of the Act. 
The act authorizes and empowers the director to make enforcement 
decisions relating to any civil or criminal remedies which may be available. 
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If he determines to proceed with a criminal prosecution, he may elect to 
refer the matter to the Utah Attorney General or a County Attorney or 
District attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction who shall provide all legal 
services for the Division and its staff. Utah Code Ann. § 61-21.5 
The Utah County Attorney cannot investigate or prosecute violations 
of the securities Act unless he is specifically requested to do so by the 
Director of the Division. 
Wayne Klein, assistant attorney General with the Attorney General's 
Office testified that he consulted with the Division of Securities and that 
they elected not to proceed with a criminal prosecution of Terry. (R. 0958, 
Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on Motions, March 21, 2001, P. 29-31, 
Addendum 18) 
The responsibilities and duties flowing from the client-lawyer 
relationship attach only after the client has requested that the lawyer render 
legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. (Addendum 28, Chapter 
13, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct) 
The criminal prosecution against terry should be dismissed on the 
grounds that the Utah county Attorney had no authority to file the 
Information in this matter or to prosecute this action. Therefore, the court 
does not have jurisdiction over terry. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is enough information in the record on appeal, together with the 
science available on the effects of drug use, of which the Court should take 
judicial notice, to conclude that Judge Harding was under the influence of, 
or materially impaired by, the use of cocaine and heroin during the time he 
presided over Terry's case. The proceedings before Judge Harding were so 
fundamentally unfair as to violate Terry's rights to due process under the 
Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States for which the 
appropriate remedy is to dismiss the case against him. 
In the alternative, the Court should remand the case to the Trial Court 
to give Terry an opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue of Judge 
Harding's alleged use of drugs during the time he presided in the case. 
The use of evidence obtained by the Division of Securities pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violates Terry's right against unreasonable search 
and seizure and should be suppressed. 
The grant of authority to investigate criminal violations under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-19 violates the constitutional principle 
of separation of powers and, therefore, the act is unconstitutional. All 
evidence obtained through the unconstitutional delegation of judicial duties 
should be suppressed. 
The use of the investigative powers of the Division of Securities to 
obtain evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution violated Terry's right 
against self incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Article I 
§12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Evidence obtained thereby, 
including any derivative evidence, should be suppressed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 24 of the Constitution of Utah and is 
facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied in this case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I 
§§ 7 and 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. The Statute is both 
facially unconstitutional and is unconstitutional as applied in this case. The 
evidence obtained under the authority of that provision should be 
suppressed. 
DATED this 16th day of July, 2003. 
Shelden R. Carter 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant, 
Terry J. Stephenson 
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